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SUPREME COURT 
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SILVER KING COALITI~O·N MINE'S 
c:OMPA'NY, a corporation, and CON-
TINENT·AL CASUALTY C0~1-
p ANY, a corporation, 
Plailntiff s, 
vs. 
INDUST.RIAL COMMIS·SION OF 
UTAH and ·SUSAN J. MITCiHELL, 
mother of Lester A. Mitchell, deceased, 
Defendants. 
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In the 
SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
SIL\rER KING COALITION MINES 
CO~IP ANY, a corporation, and CON--
TINENT·AL CASUALTY CO;M-
p ANY, a corporation, 
P laiJnti If s, 
vs. 
INDUST:RIAL CO·~i'MIS1SION OF 
UTAH and ·S·USAN J. MITCHELL, 
mother of Lester A. Mitchell, deceased, 
D-efenoonts. 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
S·TATE·MENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7171 
The Defendants feel that the Plaintiffs' Statement 
of Facts contained in their Brief on file herein suffi-
ciently presents the basic facts of this case necessary 
to an understanding of the issues involved. ·The Defen-
dants, therefore, have no additional statements of fact 
to make at this time. Defendants do, however, feel that 
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2 
the facts already before the Court do need some ampli-
fication and further interpretation, but in order to avoid 
duplications said facts will be r·eferred to in the Defen-
dants' argument. 
QUESTIO·N;S 'T'O BE CON<SIDERED 
Q·UESTION No. 1 
Was the Industrial.Commission's decision sup,ported 
by the evidence or did the commission exceed its powers 
by arbitrarily and capriciously disregarding uncontra-
dicted evidence~ 
Did the Commission abus·e its discretion in refusing 
an autopsy in this case~ 
Q·UEIS:TIO:N No. III 
Was the award in conformance with the occup~ational 
disease law of the State of Utah~ 
ARGUMENTS 
WAS T'HE IND'US~TRI,AL C~OMMISSIO;N',S DE-
CIS~O;N S:U:P·PO·RTED BY THE EVIDENCE OR DID 
THE CO·MMIS·SIO·N E~CEE'D ITiS P·OWERS BY 
ARBIT·RARILY ANID C'.A:PRICIOUS·LY DI,SREGARD-
ING UNCON·T·RAD1l 1C'TED EVIDENCE f 
The Defendants hardly feel it necessary to point 
out to this Court with any high degree of elaboration 
the numerous rulings which this honorable body and the 
Supreme Courts of all other states have handed down 
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relativ-e to the respective duties of the Industrial Com-
nlission and the Supre1ne Courts in relation to those 
cases which are decided by industrial commissions. The 
Defendants desire, therefore, only to briefly and sum-
marily refer to the law of this state on that issue. Our 
Supreme Court is limited to a determination of whether 
or not said eommission has exceeded its powers in rela-
tion to the facts or has disregarded some provision of 
law in the making or denying of ail award, or whether 
or not the commission in the decision in question has 
arbitrarily or capriciously disregarded uncontradicted 
evidence. 
(See Utah Consolidated Mining Coint)lany vs. 
Industrial Commission, 66 Utah 17'3' 240 Pac. 
440 and Kelly vs. Industrial Commission, 80 Utah 
73, 12 P&c. ('2dr lt12). 
If the commission's findings are supported by the 
evidence and if any inference may be reasonably drawn 
from the ·evidence presented to support said findings, 
our Supreme ·Court has no authority to upset the Indus-
trial Commission's decision. 
(See Park Utah Consolidated Mines vs~ In-
dustrial Commission, 84 Utah 481, 36 Pa~. ('2d) 
979; Russell vs. Industrial Commission, 86· Utah 
306, 43 Pac. (2d) 106~; Woodpurn vs~ Industrial 
Commission, ______ Utah ...... , 181 Pac. ( 2d) 209). 
The Supreme Court does not weigh conflicting evi-
denc~ nor determine which Witnesses are to be believed 
nor can it in any way su1bstitute its own judgment for 
that of the commission. 
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4 
(See Parker vs. Industrial Commission, 78 
Utah 509, 5 Pac. (2d) 573; Bain vs. Industrial 
Commission, 58 Utah 870, 199 Pac. 666; Ostler 
vs. Industrial Commission, 84 Utah 428, 36 Pac. 
(2d) 9·5; 'Tintic Standard Mining Company vs. 
Industrial Commission, 100 Utah 96, 110 Pac. 
('2d) 367 ; Norris vs. Industrial Commission, 90 
Utah 2'56, 61 Pac. (2d) 413). 
The Industrial Commission is the final arbiter of 
the facts and conflicts in the testimony and has the 
right to weigh the testimony of the various witnesses 
and to test their credibility. 
·('See Milkovich vs. Industrial Commission, 
91 Utah 498, 64 Pac. C2d) 1290; Chief Consoli-
dated Mining Company vs. Industrial Commis-
sion, 70 Utah 333, 260 p·ac. 271 ; Norris vs. In-
dustrial Commission, supra; Kent vs. Industrial 
Commission, 89 Utah 38,1, 57 Pac. (2d) 724; Sugar 
vs. Industrial Commission, 94 Utah 56, 7·5 Pac. 
(2d) 3t17). 
. Innumerable other cases could be referred to to 
support the rules given above relative to the respective 
duties of the :Sup·reme Court and the Industrial Com-
mission, but to cite further cases would he merely cumu-
lative rather than informatiVie. 
The Defendants submit that the testimony taken 
in this case at the hearing before the Industrial Com-
mission contains considerable evidence supporting the 
decision of the commission to the effect that the deceased 
co.ntracted silicosis, an· occupational disease arising out 
of and in the course of his employment, and as a result 
of his exposure to silicon dioxide dust while employed 
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by the SilYer King Coalition l\Jines at Park City, Utah, 
"~hich silieosis, an oeeupational disease; caused the death 
of said Lester.:\... )fitchell, deceased. 
Silicosis, under Utah la \Y, is defined in Section 
-±:2-la-29 U.C.~l .. 1943 as follo,vs: 
~"For the purpose of this act 'silicosis' i~ 
defined as a chronic disease of the lungs caused 
by the prolonged inhalation of silicon dioxide 
dust (Si02) characterized by·small discrete nodules 
of fibrous tissue sin1ilar ly dis semina ted through-
out both lungs, causing a characteristic X-ray pat-
tern, and by variable clinical manifestations.'' 
The Defendants qesire · herewith to point out the 
evidence supporting the fact of death having been caused 
by silicosis in the case now before the Court. Dr. William 
R. Wherritt had known the deceased since the deceased 
was born and had treated hiln over that period of time 
for various aihnents at various times. It was not until 
December 9, 1946 that Dr. Wherritt had any cause to 
examine the deceased for any matters relat;ed to his last 
illness or the illness which is now in issue before this 
body. At that time the deceased was given a physic:al 
examination. Dr. Wherritt found the deceased short of 
breath, found a rasping cough, and dilated heart with 
prominent decompensation, and determined that he was 
una:ble to work further. (Tr. 23). Dr. Wherritt took no 
X-ray pictures because he does no X-ray work, but he 
did ref.er him to Dr. L. E. Viko of the Intermountain 
Clinic in Salt Lake City, Utah. Dr. Wherritt treated the 
deceased until he died and signed the death certificate. 
He gave the immediat·e cause of death as conjestive heart 
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failure due to s.tlicosis. Apparently, he found no tuber~ 
culo~~s. (Tr. 24). Dr. Wherritt was. unaple to gi~e the 
degree of silicosis b~t qiq, ~~phasize tha.t the heart 
~f()Ub1e which was the immedia~e cause of death was 
due to the. silicosis from which t~e deceas·ed was also 
suffering at that time. He ·explained that silicosis caused 
t:q~ heart tro~ble. The condition of the lungs due to 
silicosis made it so the de~eased could not exp~nd nor 
could ·he get sufficient oxygen into his lungs. He he·came 
short of breath and would someti~es have to stop work 
from ~heer exhaustion. 'J;:his condition was what affected 
his heart and caused the heart trouble from which he 
' . ' ' '. 
~ied. D-r. Wherritt also explained on cross examination 
that even tho~gh he could not state the degree of silicosis 
suffere(l by the deceas·ed, tpe effect of the silicosis would 
be in p~roportion to its advancem·ent. If it were a mild 
case of silicosis it would not have much effect on the 
h~art but as the silicosis adva:nced in severity its effect 
on t~e heart would become greater; but that silicosis 
definitely did have effect upon the heart. for the reasons 
stated (Tr. 25 and 26). 
Dr. L. E. Viko of the Intermountain Clinic in Salt 
' . "• ' ' ' . '. ..1 ' ' 
L~ke City is no ~oubt consider,e(l one of the best heart 
sp~:eialists i:Q t:h~ ~tate of Utah. At the 4Istance of Dr. 
Wherr~tt the deceaseq. was ·exam~neg by Dr. Viko on 
December 17, 1946. Dr. Viko· fo~d the deceased suffer-
ing from silicosis and cor pulmonale 4ue to chronic lung 
disea,se. Cor puJ.:rnonlille, as defined by Dr. Viko, means 
''heart disease d-qe to: chronic lung disease.'' (Tr. 30-
3.4 and 35). Dr. Viko foun:d ''a moderately severe'' case 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
of silicosis "ri th the deceas~d; that 'the silicosis was 
severe enough to eause disablement; that the silicosis 
plus the heart disease made the deceased totally dis-
abled; that the heart disease of the deceased was caused 
by the silicosis and its complications, and that the sili-
cosis 'Yas an important f&ctor and an essential cause in 
the production of the heart disease which was the final 
cause of death (Tr. 31-'32-33 and 36). Dr. Viko had 
X-ray pictures taken and the results of his examination 
were verified by the pictures. In other words,_ the X-ray 
also disclosed- silicosis and heart disease. Dr. Viko was 
~ery definite in his conclusions that silicosis was a con-
tributing factor to the deceased's qeath even though the 
beart condition mi~ht have been classed as the chief 
cause of death. ('Tr. 31 and 32). Again it might be 
pointed out that Dr. Viko is a very noted heart special-
ist and th~t his testjmo~y n.ow rela.tes to matters about 
which he shoulq be very well a~vise~. He was placed 
-qnder strenuous cross examinatio:p. and verified the mat-
ters which have here been called to the _Court's atten-
tion. As with Dr. Wherritt, he also made the point 
which seems ve.ry simple and reasonable; namely, that 
a slig~t degree of silicosis is bound to ~ffect breathing 
and the use of the lungs in ~ slight degree, b~t the fact 
remains it -does affect the hea-rt by maJP_ng breathing 
more diffi~ult and the functioning -of t:he heart in con-
nection with the lungs more difficult. For the same 
reason a severe case of silicosis would affect the breath-
ing and the -p;se of th~ lungs to a much gr~eater degree 
and would put much greater strain on the heart; but 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
. ' 
again the fact ren1ains that the heart is affected in· these 
cases. ( Tr. 85) .. 
Dr. Paul S. Richards was used by the Plaintiffs in 
this case as one of their witnesses. His testimony is very 
completely reported in the Plaintiffs' Brief and the 
. . 
Defendants therefore refrain from any ·extensive review 
of the same testimony. Dr. Richards seems to be p:er-
sonally of the opinion that the deceased had a moderate 
amount of silicosis. He had never personally seen the 
deceased but based his decision upon examining the 
X-rays taken by Dr. Viko. It is clear from his testimony 
that he was at all times in doubt when called upon to 
make definite statements. H~ seemed also to he of the 
personal opinion. that the heart trouble of the deceased 
could not have been caused by the degree of silicosis 
suffered by the deceased. He did spend a lot of time, 
however, explaining that there are two ~elds of though't," 
one that silicosis affects the heart and another that 
silicosis does not affect the heart and that he; himself, 
was inclined to believe with the latter ·group. Dr. Rich-
ards admitted that where a doctor is able to contact a 
patient peTsonally he is in· a much better position to 
determine the nature of the p·atient's ailments, and that 
had he had an opportunity to have seen the patient per~ 
sonally he would be in a much better position to advise 
as to whether or not he had silicosis. (Tr. 42). Dr. 
Richards further advised that if he knew that a patient 
had been· exposed to ~angerous dusts and should see 
other symptoms related to silicosis and knew the man's 
history, then ''you ·could interpret into these films (X-ray 
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pictures of the deceased) that he has silicosis''. ( Tr. 
42). It might. he pointed out to the Court that Drs. 
Wherrit and \'iko had personal contact \\'ith the deceased, 
kne\Y his history, observed him \vhile alive and that there 
is evidence of exposui"e to silicon dioxide dust. The de-
ceased had a long history of \York underground at the 
Silver King Coalition niines. (Tr. 38). These doctors 
"-ho had the contact \vhich Dr. Richards stated was 
advisable hesitated in no \Vay whatsoever to state that 
the deceased had silicosis and that it contributed to his 
final cause of death. Dr. Richards finally, after much 
examination, admitted that he did not know the cause 
of death in the case of Lester A. Mitchell, deceased. 
(Tr. 45 ). 
DID THE COM~fiSSIO~N ABUS·E IT~S DISCRE-
TION IN REFUSING AN AUTOP:sy IN THIS C·A·SE 0? 
Our State law does provide for the ordering of an 
autopsy in those cases where '·'in the o:pinion of the 
commission it is necessary to accurately and scientifically 
ascertain the cause of death". ( 42-'la-47, U.C.A., 1943). 
It is conceded that the commission refused to order the 
autopsy in this case partly out of deference to the 
wishes of the deceased's family but primarily because 
at no time did it appear to the commission that the caus~e 
of death could not be otherwis·e determined. 1The facts 
which must he depended upon by the commission to 
rule on the cause of death are so closely related to this 
particular issue that the Defendants f·eel that a decision 
on that question would more or less automatically decide 
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the issue in this particular problem. In other words, 
if the commission properly acted within its powers in 
deciding that silicosis was the cause of death, then a 
decision that no autopsy was necessary would also be 
p~roper because we must then say that a decision as to 
the cause of death needed no autopsy. ·The D·efendants 
also desire to point out that Dr. Viko stated that no 
autopsy was necessary to determine the type of heart 
trouble suffered by the deceased; that no autopsy was 
needed to determine if silicosis was there or that one 
had contributed to the other. Dr. Viko did say that an 
autopsy would settle the question of degree to which 
the silicosis in the deceased's lungs had advanc·ed but 
he did not advise it as necessary. (Tr. 36). We submit 
that the granting or the failure to grant an order for 
an autopsy is purely discretionary with the commission 
and whether the· right to such art autopsy was properly 
or improperly denied in this case will be automatically 
determined in the issue of whether or not there was suffi-
cient evidence to support the decision and the award 
of the commission. 
WAS THE AWARD IN C·O·NF'ORMANCE WITH 
THE OCCUPATIO·NAL DISE·ASE LAW O·F THE 
STATE OF UT·AH' 
The matter of de'pendency in this case related to a 
mother depending on her son, the deceased herein; and 
it is a case where dependency is not presumed but must 
be determined from the facts (See Section 42-'1-·67, U. C.A., 
19'43). Evidence was taken in the case before the Court 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
to determine dependency and Commissioner Egan of 
the Industrial Conunission led the inquiry to 111ake such 
deternll.nation. The evidence shows that the u1other 's 
dependency on the son in most all respects, namely, for 
food, taxes, 1naintenance of the home and their persons, 
and in n1ost all other \Ya.ys, was testified to. The only 
exception to a case of co1nplete dependency was that 
the mother, a.s applicant, owned the home and was on 
relief getting a!bout enough money to pay for part of 
the clothing that she needed. The deceased son was the 
only person giving support to the applicant and after 
the son's death social 8ecurity was paid to the mother. 
Dependency is not a question of complete dependency 
and is not determined by whether or not the dependent 
person gets every cent needed for his or her support 
from the person depended upon but whether or not there 
is any dependency in fact, whether or not an obligation 
exists (which is recognized by our statute) and whether 
or not thi8 dependency existed at the time of death and 
was needed to maintain the claimant in her station in 
life. 
(See Hancock vs. Industrial Commission, 58 
Utah 192, 198 Pac. 169; Park Utah Consolidated 
}lines vs. Industrial Commission, supra; Rigby 
vs. Industrial Commission, 75 Utah 454, 286 Pac. 
·628). 
As in other compensation cases, deiJ,endency is a 
question of fact and it is up to th~e Industrial Commis-
sion to determine that fact. There is certainly sufficient 
evidence to warrant such a finding and unless said deci-
sion or finding appears to your honorable body to be 
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arbitrary and capricious, the commission's decision 
should stand. 
(iSee Rigby vs. Industrial Commission, supra;· 
Utah Fuel Company vs. Industrial ·commission, 
80 Utah 301, 15 Pac. (2d) 2'97). · 
It is unfortunate that the decision of the commission 
failed to contain concise words showing definitely a find-. 
ing of dependency but certainly such words would add 
nothing material.. Certainly the plaintiffs cannot claim 
surprise or injury becaus-e dependency would have to 
be an issue. in this case. The applicant app.eared in the 
capacity of a dependent; the case had to either be heard,: 
or denied on that very iss~e. The commission took step's 
a.s disclosed by the record, to determine the question of 
dependency and the mere fact that the ap·plication was 
not denied and ~hat an a"\vard was made, is in and of 
its-elf, especially in vie'v of thes~e facts, a finding of 
dependency. It is conceded that even though an impli-
cation of dependency is not the best substitute for an 
actual finding, the· D:efendants contend that the r;equire-. 
1nent of the law has been met. 
The Plaintiff objects further to the manner in which 
the decision was worded. The Plaintiff app~arently fears 
that in case of death or re-marriage, the award remains 
a.s is regardless of any other contingency that might 
happen. D·efendants desire to submit that this manner 
of making awards has been going on for some time ; that 
as yet no trouble has arisen and that a study of Section 
42-la-3'3 should reveal that the statut~e protects the Plain-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
tiff against any of these c.ontingencies arising. This sec-
tion provides that imn1ediately upon thes·e contingencies 
arising, the beneficiary shall be entitl·ed to receive one-
third of the benefits remaining unp~aid. Defendants fail 
to see 'Yhere any particular 'vording or failure to insert 
some partic.ular wording would caneel the .effect of this 
statute. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion it is subn1itted that the decision of the 
commission awarding compensation to the mother of the 
deceased should be affirmed for the reasons herein 
stated. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GROVER A. GILE·s 
Attorney Getmenal 
·C. N. Q:T·TOS·EN 
Assistant A.t"borney Genetral 
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